Pushing Out Gador
The penultimate months of 1943 saw Gador frantically imposing his command in Negros Island. As a unit independent from the 7th Military District, thus not being recognized by General MacArthur, Gador was placed in a tight spot. Some of his trusted officers, like Maj. Julian Aspilla – his chief of staff – and Maj. Alfredo Estacion, had left him a month after the meeting with Villamor. They now were able to see the futility of Gador’s claim as leader of the Negros guerrilla command, and they saw that Villamor was indeed sent by SWPA from Australia to work along with the guerrilla units. Failure to cooperate with him, therefore, was tantamount to disobeying the person whom they looked up to as more or less a king, the venerable General Douglas MacArthur.
As a sign of his desperation, Gador then issued a memorandum to his officers and enlisted men of the 73rd Division dated on 30 October 1943. Here he purported that the main mission of the 73rd Division now to recruit more men to his guerrilla unit. Furthermore, he belabored his point that he still was rightfully recognized leader of the Negros Island guerrilla forces. He showed his disdain of his officers who left him stating that they were deserters and created a sort of divide between Negros Oriental and Negros Occidental officers by saying that all officers and men from Negros Oriental did not accede to leaders from Negros Occidental; not to mention that those officers who left him were mostly from Negros Occidental. On his former chief-of-staff Aspilla, he commented that: ‘It strikes me as if this dismissed officer is posing himself as President Quezon, General MacArthur, G-1, Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, Finance Officer, etc. all rolled into one, for the purpose of making himself appear convincing. Col. Fenton tried that same trick once in Cebu and failed. You know where is now.’
Gador now pushed for draconian measures to deal with deserters or defectors. Officers who defected from Gador’s unit with families in Payabon, Manjuyod had a hard time evacuating their families. Aspilla was lucky enough that his family – consisting of small children and his wife – were able to escape via a harder route to the hinterlands. And those who were caught leaving Victory Hill in Payabon had to pay their lives as a price. As Maj. Estacion, one of Gador’s officers who defected, recalled: ‘Gador seemingly lacks a screw in his head and the result is that officers and soldiers leaving Payabon would be shot on sight if they are found leaving the area.’ It took a while though for men like Aspilla and Estacion to realize what kind of a leader Gador was. The latter would then emphasize on his regret on joining Gador later on and realized that ‘loyalty is more for a cause and not for the person.’
The man tasked to lead a mission to push out Gador and his loyal men out of Negros was no other than his former Chief of Staff, Maj. Julian Aspilla. This impetus for such a drastic action was triggered when Gador refused to join the conference called by Maj. Villamor in October, days before he left, as ordered by General Douglas MacArthur. This was the final straw, and Aspilla – who recently just defected from Gador – had to do something about it.
In his letter to Col. Abcede on 28 October 1943, he informed the latter of the dangers or risks of his mission since there were some officers of Gador ‘…who have swallowed the insidious propaganda… about his supposed command and authority.’ The ultimate goal, however, was for the officers and enlisted men of Gador to join Aspilla and fall in line to Abcede’s 7th Military District command. To do this, Aspilla needed the assistance of two other officers – Capt. Larot and Capt. Mendaros. Aside from that, he also needed ‘tangible support’ from Abcede’s 7th Military District, that is to say, he needed weapons and ammunitions from Abcede. If provided for, Aspilla thought that he can successfully defeat Gador as he knew that if he would just have a ‘respectable force’ in his command, then it would be relatively easier to force Gador and his loyal men out of Negros. The mission was simple – it was to get rid of Gador whom Aspilla believed was the only man who obstructed the unification of Negros guerrilla command. Courageous as he was, Aspilla then reminded Abcede in his letter that: ‘I am here undaunted in the face of danger as I have told you I would be willing to offer my life if necessary for the unification of Negros.’
The coup against Gador started late November 1943 and by the first week of December, specifically 7 December 1943, Gador then – as Aspilla himself foresaw – left Negros for Cebu and then later on moved to Bohol. It was a bloodless coup, as there were no casualties from both sides; it seemed that most of his officers and enlisted men were tired of the in-fighting. Gador only had a few loyal men who went with him to Cebu and Bohol; those who did not join him were assimilated to Abcede’s 7th Military District, specifically as part of the Special District Headquarters Troop, then the next year on April 1944 as part of the 7th Provisional Regiment, and by December 1944 as part of the 77th Infantry.
Interestingly, even when Gador was in Cebu and Bohol, his divisiveness still persisted. He still believed that he was the rightful leader of the Negros guerrillas and lobbied for backing from the officers of the Cebu Area Command and then Bohol Area Command. He was considered, however, as a nuisance and was not really taken seriously by the Maj. Cushing from Cebu and even Lt. Ingeniero, who was his subordinate before the war, from Bohol. But even when he was already in Bohol, he still did not stop from interfering on the affairs of the 7th MD, as he continued to issue ‘…manifestos and various other sundry orders.’ Suffice it to say, all these issuances passed by deaf ears – but Gador, as stubborn as he was, did not mind it and continued with his futile obstructionist actions while outside Negros.
The Wild Unit’s Last Stand
With Puring gone, the cusp of the Wild Unit’s leadership was passed down to his brother, Margarito Gemillan, an ex-convict before the war. Together with Margarito were the loyal officers/advisers like Jubela and Trasmonte, both were still not convinced by Abcede’s leadership of the 7th Military District. When Gador was pushed out from Negros in 7 December 1943, the Wild Unit still continued to exist in their area of jurisdiction, which was from Vallehermoso to San Carlos. They still continued with their obstructionist actions and showed defiance against Abcede’s 7th Military District; they refused to cooperate, and they were the only remaining obstacle to the unification of the Negros guerrilla command, through Abcede’s 7th Military District.
Looking into the reasons why they refused to cooperate, from the accounts of one of the advisers Victorino Jubela, the main reason for them was that they never believed that Major Villamor was sent by General MacArthur. They thought that had he been instructed by MacArthur to come to Negros, he would have went around the entire island and not just stay with Col. Abcede in the mountains of Cawayan, Negros Occidental. Moreover, they took Gador’s propaganda hook, line, and sinker and believed that he was the rightful commander – given his rank – of the guerrilla organization in Negros.
Due to the Wild Unit’s belligerence, the combined forces of Abcede-Mata-Mercado attacked them from all sides in their base in Vallehermoso. Abcede’s men came from the west, Mata’s men from the North, while Mercado’s men pressured them from the south. The attack started on 3 April 1944 and it was a well-organised attack which was continuous from day and night. As Major M.C. Caoile, an officer of the Wild Unit, recalled: ‘At several instances, their attacks on us came in simultaneously with the attacks of the common enemy which at times led us to believe that they are pro-Japanese.’ Another officer of the Wild Unit, Captain Jose Galvez reported that the combined forces of the 7th Military District burned several civilian houses in Vallehermoso, specifically targeting those civilians who had in any way provided material help or any form of assistance to the members of the Wild Unit. It took the 7th Military District around sixteen days to eventually push the Wild Unit out of Negros, and credit must be given to the latter as they held on for sixteen days – defending themselves and the civilians in their area – given that they did not have the same firepower as the men of the 7th Military District, who were freshly armed with new weapons – like new carbines, Thompsons, automatic rifles, etc. – and ammunition.
Losing morale and ammunition, Margarito Gemillan and his loyal men crossed the Tañon Straight and escaped to Cebu at night time. On reaching Cebu, Gemillan and his officers then submitted their reports to the Maj. Cushing’s Cebu Area Command and volunteered to serve under him. One can only infer why they just did not do the same thing back in Negros Island – they could have just acceded to Abcede’s command as Gador, during the time of the attack and even months before that, was already out of Negros. Most likely the reason why they did not yield to Abcede was out of pride and misplaced loyalty – they were indubitably loyal to Gador and, from the previous accounts, they seemed highly doubtful of Abcede’s leadership.
Later on, it was known that Margarito Gemillan and quite a number of loyal Wild Unit men had left Cebu to follow Gador in Bohol. In Bohol, they gave Lt. Ingeniero, the leader of the unified Bohol Area Command, a headache as they continued with their obstructionist policies and were very uncooperative. It was even mentioned by Victorino Jubela, who did not go with Gemillan to Bohol, that the latter had purportedly told the former that Gador had a plan to retake Negros Oriental from the 7th Military District. Vengeful as he was, Gemillan was then convinced by Gador to go to Bohol and plan the so-called retake of Negros Oriental – a plan which did not gain fruition, as typical of Gador, he was just a man of words, not action.
Back in Negros Oriental, the remaining men of the Wild Unit who did not join Gemillan to Cebu and Bohol were absorbed in the 72nd Field Artillery. Finally, by mid-1944, the encumbrances to the unification of the Negros Island guerrilla command were gone and the 7th Military District of Negros was starting to gain traction as a unified guerrilla command under Col. Salvador Abcede by mid-1944.
Suffice it to say, this case in Negros Oriental where guerrilla units almost started a full-blown civil war within the province seems like a typical Filipino thing to do. The leaders involved were mostly men full of hubris – or just full of themselves. Their minds have been permeated by the feeling of envy, mostly driven by insecurities against other individuals; and this insecurity would get the most of them.
It’s funny to see the same things happening at present in Philippine society – where people still feed of each other’s insecurities, becoming bullies – or as I call them, insecure bullies – who use their power and influence to gatekeep others from succeeding or who power trip just to feel better about themselves.
This is what happened almost 80 years ago in Negros Island among the guerrilla units during World War 2, but this is still happening now almost everywhere in the country.
As a society, how then can we get rid of this plague of insecurity and envy towards fellow Filipinos? Is it even possible to extirpate these traits among us?
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Author’s email: [email protected]
