The internal friction among guerrilla units in Negros was becoming a problem and had deleterious ramifications in the supposed fight against a common enemy, i.e., the Japanese imperial army. As R.B. Silliman narrated: ‘Different units had different passes and passwords, and they were not mutually recognized. Soldiers of one group would attempt to disarm those of another sometimes to the point of actually firing at each other. Soldiers who had trouble with their leader over a question of discipline would desert and join another group. Soldiers felt free to quit or return to their homes whenever they pleased. There were serious threats and dispute over territorial jurisdiction, as well as over guns and soldiers who had left one unit to join another.’
The Negros guerrillas were in complete disarray. Abcede, with the support Peralta (CO of the 8th Military District stationed in Panay Island) was trying his best to unify the entire island into one guerrilla command, but others like Gador and the Wild Unit did not willingly cooperate, and Ausejo of the 75th Infantry Regiment in Southern Negros Oriental was reporting to Brig. Gen. Fertig of the 10th Military District in Mindanao. It seemed that a few more military encounters would lead to a civil war among guerrillas in Negros. The internal conflict was like a complicated web of guerrilla unit rivalries – Abcede versus Gador, Ausejo versus Abcede, Mata versus the Wild Unit, Mercado versus Gador, and so on.
Who then should lead the guerrillas? And how was this internal friction settled? In hindsight, and this was by and large accepted as a ‘general rule’ among guerrillas, ‘…command of the early guerrilla organization was determined not on the basis of rank, but by a combination of the two factors of personal leadership and the number of rifles which any given individual could round up.’ In this pretense, it was clear that Abcede – being a stalwart leader and having 500-600 rifles – was the one who was highly qualified to become the commanding officer of the entire Negros guerrilla force. Second was Mata, then followed by Ausejo, Gador and the Wild Unit really did not have enough weapons, let alone good leadership. But, given that Abcede was the most qualified, how would he be able to assume command given the discord that was happening within the Negros guerrilla organization? The solution to all the kerfuffle going on was a young (only 30 years old) intelligence officer, Major Jesus Villamor.
Sent on a mission by General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area [SWPA] Command, Villamor’s immediate task in the Philippines, specifically in Southern Negros, was to establish an intelligence network and report directly to MacArthur ‘…on guerrilla personalities and organizations for use in SWPA decisions.’ Landing in southern Negros on January 1943, Villamor first came into contact with the units of Ausejo and Abcede. He was clearly instructed, however, not to meddle in the local guerrilla affairs – like the on-going internal friction happening in the guerrilla command of Negros Island; but, Villamor could not properly perform his mission with all the obstacles that he had to face, one of which was the divisiveness of the Negros guerrilla organization. He, then, reported directly to Gen. MacArthur, stating some of his recommendations in dealing with the internecine strife in the guerrilla command of Negros Island, specifically in dealing with obstructionists like Gador and the Wild Unit. Unfortunately, there was no immediate action taken by the General MacArthur and the SWPA. As a result, what remained in Negros was still a divided guerrilla command, and Gador started capitalizing on this – becoming all the more ‘defiant of local attempts to secure his cooperation in the settlement of the command question.’
Taking matters in his own hand, Villamor then made the drastic decision, of course with the approval of the SWPA, to appoint himself as commanding officer of the guerrilla organization in Negros Island on 14 May 1943. He emphatically told the guerrilla officers that: ‘The Japs are drinking toasts to us for fighting among ourselves, for not making severe trouble for them… right now you are nothing but a disorganised group of fighting men.’ Consequently, Ausejo and Bell were convinced by Villamor, with orders from the Gen. MacArthur, to break-off from Gen. Fertig’s command and join the unified Negros Guerrilla Command, now known as the 7th Military District. As Villamor promised the guerrilla officers in Negros, his stint as commanding officer was only temporary since he would just relinquish the command when he would find a competent officer to lead the guerrillas in Negros.
In his first meeting with the guerrilla officers of Negros Island on June 1943 – which was attended by all the guerrilla unit leaders, including Gador – Villamor explained to them that ‘in the new organization all former officers would keep the rank they held before the surrender and all non-commissioned officers who had become guerrilla officers would take the rank of acting third lieutenant.’ He then went on to appoint Gador as Executive Officer, Ausejo as G-3, Abcede as CO of the 72nd Divisions, and Mata as Abcede’s Chief of Staff.
Gador, however, took umbrage and asserted that he was the most senior officer in Negros; thus, he believed that he should take command of the guerrilla forces in Negros Island, let alone the entire Visayas region. Villamor was adamant though – still reaffirming his decision that Gador would only be the Executive Officer of the newly re-organised 7th Military District. As Maj. Uldarico Baclagon, a witness to the meeting himself, recounted: ‘In spite of assurances that he [Gador] would eventually command the district, Gador refused to be under Villamor so that he was relieved as executive officer and therefore remained outside district command.’
The day after the meeting, Villamor and the other guerrilla leaders were met by Japanese patrol; consequently, a battle ensued against the combined Negros guerrilla forces – a semblance of the bright future ahead – and the Japanese forces. In the heat of the battle, Villamor realized that Gador and his unit did not help and were seen fleeing as the Japanese started to approach. This incident strengthened Villamor’s resolve that Gador was not competent to be Executive Officer, much less the Commanding Officer of the 7th Military District. This was the last time that Gador met with Villamor and other guerrilla officers, as he continued with his illusion of grandeur that he was – or would remain – the overall commanding officer of the Negros guerrilla forces.
With Gador out of the picture already, Villamor’s first choice to replace him as district commander was Col. Abcede. Villamor and Abcede had a close relationship built on mutual respect, one which the former – and even the latter – did not have with Gador. On Villamor, Abcede lamented by saying that: ‘I have considered Major Villamor as an Army man with a high sense of honor. While he was here I never doubted his mission. He laid bare to me what he wanted. We discussed the various aspects and I gave my opinion. He made his decision after which I knew it was my duty to follow instructions.’ The most qualified person then for the job, when Villamor would relinquish command, was Abcede. True enough, with the order of General MacArthur, Villamor officially appointed Abcede as District Commander of the 7th Military District on 24 July 1943.
Undaunted by Abcede’s appointment, Gador continued leading his men, issuing orders – independent from the 7th MD – from his station in Payabon, Manjuyod. As if nothing happened between him and Villamor, Gador sent a letter to Villamor asking for weapons and ammunitions from him as he learned that a US submarine, USS Thresher, was able to land in the southern part of Negros Island and delivered around ‘5,000 pounds of stores, 20,000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition, and the same amount of .45 ammunitions.’ It has been said in this letter that Gador was not only asking for weapons and ammunitions, but also one or two million pesos from the 7th Military District. These demands were undoubtedly impossible to meet. In his reply to Gador, however, Villamor simply told him that he would relay his demands to Col. Abcede, the district commander of the 7th Military District. Not contented, and perhaps to clear things with Abcede, by 4 August 1943, Gador sent a letter to Abcede hoping to make amends and clear the air by stating that all the false propaganda and gossip that Abcede purportedly heard from him were untrue. Thinking perhaps of an imminent attack against him by the now unified and heavily armed 7th Military District, Gador meekly appealed to Abcede to prevent any military encounters with independent units (like his and the Wild Unit) that did not accede to the latter’s command. He wanted to ‘forestall civil war’ in Negros – stating that ‘this war is bad enough for our soldiers and for our civilians. A civil war will be worse.’
It can be inferred that Gador realized that he and his men were in grave threat as Abcede’s 7th Military District was now fully unified – with Mata, Ausejo, and Mercado’s units – and fully armed, with the supply of ammunitions delivered by USS Thresher. Lacking in weapons and ammunitions, he was afraid that his unit cannot defend themselves against an imminent attack by the 7th Military District. He knew that he was at the mercy of Abcede, and only time will tell when he and his unit will be pushed out of Negros. In spite of this situation, Gador – being the stubborn person that he was – still refused to recognize Abcede as the commanding officer of the Negros Area Command, and saw himself as still, based on General Sharp’s order, the leader of the Negros guerrilla forces.
Suffice it to say, Major Jesus Villamor’s role in unifying the guerrilla forces proved to have had a positive impact to the resistance movement in Negros Island. There was strength in unity; and as a result of the re-organization of the 7th Military District, there was already – in paper and in practice – an effective and well-organized guerrilla command that can provide General MacArthur with what he expected from the guerrillas, that is, information. This was the main role that General MacArthur expected from the guerrillas – to become ‘intelligence information gatherers’, since the information which they can gather would then ‘…give the American forces a tremendous advantage in planning military operations in and around the Philippines.’
This was the original mission of Villamor, he was supposed to create an intelligence and radio network in Negros, but he first had to settle the internal conflict in the Negros guerrilla command in order to effectively do what he was supposed to do. He hit two birds with one stone, and he returned to Australia, on board submarine USS Cabrilla, with his mission accomplished on 20 October 1943.
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Author’s email: [email protected]
