I do not claim to be a military historian, but most of my researches have been about the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, specifically on Negros Oriental. Much of it involves the issue of political collaboration, resistance movements against the Japanese imperial forces, Japanese wartime atrocities, and, just recently, daily life of civilians living during WW2. Thus, when I attended the faculty seminar on World War II sponsored by the National World War II Museum (New Orleans, Louisiana, USA) from June 24-30, 2024, there were undoubtedly quite a lot of new things that I learned from the military historians who conducted the seminar through various lectures. It was a week-long comprehensive seminar on topics mostly germane to military history and World War II.
I knew some of these lecturers already as I got the chance to attend and present a research paper in a workshop last year sponsored by the same institution. One of them was Dr. John Curatola, a former marine officer who is now a resident military historian at the Jenny Craig Institute for War and Democracy of the National World War II Museum.
In his lecture, he highlighted the significance of military doctrine, as it provides a context, or a methodology both of strategic and tactical importance. Basically, it served (and will continue to serve) as a guide for soldiers to execute military operations at the strategic (what are you trying to achieve? The ends as they called it), operational (how to achieve it? The ways), and tactical level (how to get to achieve it? The ways).
At the end of the day, wars will always be political by nature. It’s all political and it’ll always have a political objective. For example, Hitler’s reason for waging war against his neighboring European countries was brought about by his Nazi political agenda emphasizing on the purported dominance of the “Aryan” race. As a result, he wanted to give more space for the German people, calling this as Lebensraum. To achieve his expansionist goals, Hitler needed to wage war and occupy neighboring European countries.
War, therefore – as the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, postulated – is merely the continuation of policy by other means.
Conversely, the Allied power’s goal in World War II was the total and unconditional surrender of their enemies, the Axis powers. This was their goal at the strategic level, and this would frame everything else underneath it, like the operational level (how to get to achieve it?) and tactical level (means of achieving it). According to Dr. Curatola, the strategic level involves national policies and theater strategies; the operational level involves campaigns and major operations; while the tactical level involves battles, engagements, and small-unit/crew actions.
Suffice it to say, he set the example of the United States’ goal in World War II. At the strategic level, the goal was unconditional surrender. To do this, at the operational level, the factor of differences among the capabilities of skills of Generals will definitely matter. In the case of the European Theater of War, especially in Northern Europe and the Mediterranean, he mentioned that strategic bombing played an important role at the operational level; same goes in the Pacific Theater of War, but with the addition of the island-hopping campaign of General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz. Thereafter, at the tactical level comes the different battles like the ones in D-Day, Battle of the Bulge, Midway, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Leyte, and so on. These are the means of achieving the said strategic goal of unconditional surrender.
After learning this framework, I realized that most of the researches I have written are at the tactical level – looking into the various battles and engagements of Japanese and Filipino guerrilla forces. It’s a form of microhistory, so to speak, on the engagements of guerrilla forces in Negros Oriental. The best thing to do, however, is that if you write about the tactical level, you must also include the operational and strategic levels to provide context and direction to the historical narrative that you are writing about. This will, therefore, give the reader a holistic viewpoint of your chosen subject.
On another note, I’ve also learned a lot from the other professors (mostly historians) who participated in the said faculty seminar. To network with some of them and talk about our respective field or subject of interests was indeed one of the highlights of the seminar. This is one of the things which an academic should do – create connections with other fellow academics or network with them.
Being the introverted type, I was, at the outset, quite shy to talk to most of them; but there is no other chance to build relationships but on those few days where you are with them, so you better have to make the most out of your time. This is the challenge for the young academics (which I still consider myself as one), as most of us either get intimidated by other fellow academics (especially the older ones).
By and large, however, I learned a lot of things from the faculty seminar in World War II History, and I would like to thank NORSU, especially to former president Dr. Joel P. Limson, for allowing me to go and travel to the US to attend the seminar (I was the only one from the Philippines, the rest were from the US), and also to the historians and staff of the Jenny Craig Institute for War and Democracy (especially to the executive director, Dr. Mike Bell) for accepting my application.
Soon enough, I hope that someone here in the Philippines will spearhead the creation of a museum similar to the National World War II Museum in New Orleans, as it behooves us to remember or commemorate the heroes who fought valiantly against the Japanese occupying forces during WWII. Aside from that, a museum showing the brutalities of war would also let the current generation understand the inimical effects of war – a stark reminder that nobody wins in wars.
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