Dumagueteños, or Oriental Negrenses in general, continue to celebrate “Liberation Day” from the Japanese forces on 26th of April every year. But do we really remember the story of how we were liberated by the Americans? And how come – given that there were only a few Japanese squads, known as suicide units, left in Dumaguete by April 1945 – the guerrillas did not liberate us first before the Americans arrived?
In hindsight, Negros Oriental had not been completely controlled by the Japanese forces during the latter years of the war. The only towns that the Japanese controlled during this time were Dumaguete, Bacong, Sibulan, and Luzuriaga (now known as Valencia); all these towns are now known as part of Metro Dumaguete.
Col. Satoshi Oie and the 174th Independent Infantry Battalion, the unit assigned in Negros Oriental, tried to appease the people of the province but to no avail. Their main mission, aside from appeasing the people of Negros Oriental, was to defend the seaport and airfield of Dumaguete as well as the alcohol factory in Bais. They did, however, stop performing the mission when the guerrillas overrun Bais in November 1944, and when Dumaguete airfield was deemed inoperable by January 1945.
Although there were some Dumagueteños who actively collaborated with the Japanese, majority of the local populace spoke with contumely against the Japanese forces, more so against the Kempeitai (the Japanese secret police), who were responsible for the many tortures and executions of civilians in the Province from September to December 1944.
In fact, my grandmother, 97 years old, will never forget the word kempeitai as she told me that they’re the most dreaded group (“gikahadlokan na grupo”) in Dumaguete during the latter years of the war.
More Japanese wartime atrocities occurred starting on September 1944, as the first American air raids happened during this time.
Thus, in retaliation, the Kempeitai became more suspicious and arrested, tortured, and killed as many civilians as they can – those who were suspected of collaborating with the guerrillas, or being part of the underground movement.
The atrocities worsened by January to April 1945, as Colonel Oie and his men started to prepare for their defenses in Luzuriaga, specifically around the area of Mt. Talinis. It became worse during this time as the Japanese knew they were fighting a losing battle, and out of desperation – and perhaps retribution against civilians, whom they believed were loyal to the guerrillas – did horrible and egregious crimes against the civilians.
After months of preparing the fortifications around Mt. Talinis, on 21 March 1945, Colonel Oie and a few hundred of his men, together with some collaborators, evacuated to Luzuriaga via the Palinpinon road, and finally settled in the fortified camp in the hills of Luzuriaga, just around the Mt. Talins area.
Oie ordered a few of their units to remain in Dumaguete and to be led by Major Takada of the Airfield Construction Unit. Later on, Major Takada and the remaining Japanese forces in Dumaguete evacuated the town around 3:00 in the morning on 26 April 1945 – just before the Americans arrived; but there were still some suicide units that remained in Dumaguete.
According to the generally accepted historical narrative, two battalions of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the Americal Division were the ones responsible for liberating Dumaguete from the Japanese forces.
The men of these battalions docked in Lo-oc, Siquijor in the morning of 26 April 1945 virtually unopposed, and marched to Dumaguete with only a few encounters with Japanese forces.
In fact, the Americans even had a misencounter with the local guerrilla forces who mistakenly, if zealously, shot at them as they thought they were enemies.
The civilians in downtown Dumaguete warmly received the liberating American forces. They were ecstatic and relieved at the same time to see the Americans as it only meant they were safe from harm.
The guerrillas, on the other hand, were under the command of Maj. Galicano Sibala who – together with his men – perforce had to work with the American forces. Some of his men, however, did not understand why they were not allowed to liberate Dumaguete themselves as they were so close to achieving it in the morning of 26 April 1945, just before the Americans arrived.
As the story goes, by mid-January 1945, Col. Salvador Abcede, head of the 7th Military District, ordered Major Sibala of the 75th Infantry Regiment to make plans on the subsequent attack and liberation of Dumaguete.
The plan, according to Sibala, “was to have a two-pointed attack with the 3rd Battalion under Capt. Federico Ridad to be loaded on bancas to land along the boulevard which we knew was unguarded and attack from there all pockets of resistance, street fighting if necessary.”
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion under Capt. Justo Sibala would have to cross Banica River from the south and meet with the 3rd Battalion’s left flank. They were then tasked to “clean up pockets of resistance up to the West Central School and prevent escape of Japanese troops to the hills west of Dumaguete.”
The plan of Major Sibala, however, did not push through as the Japanese forces in Dumaguete were able to sift through the gap of the guerrilla defense lines when the 2nd Battalion, under Capt. Demetrio Alviola, was removed from their position along the western portion of Dumaguete.
As a result, on the evening of 21 March 1945, Colonel Oie and the Japanese forces surreptitiously, under the cover of darkness, evacuated to Luzuriaga. The person blamed by Abcede for this military blunder was Maj. Ceferino Galvez, commanding officer of the 73rd Provisional Division.
Consequently, Abcede relieved Galvez, and replaced him with Sibala, who did not expect to be promoted at that time given that he was only 26 years old.
On 24 April 1945, two days before the liberation of Dumaguete, Major Sibala was given an order by Abcede to attack Dumaguete.
Following orders, Sibala then called his battalion commanders to position their troops along the Banica River “as close as they could get without getting detected” and start the advance the next day at daybreak. The advance, however, started at dawn on 26 April 1945.
In Sibala’s own words, “After issuing the orders, I checked up on the putting up of the aid station under Captain Jose Garcia for treatment of whatever casualties may be from the firing line. Under cover of darkness, our troops creeped towards the south bank of Banica River and early dawn started firing across the river. The Japanese pill boxes and foxholes on the north side of the river fired back preventing the crossing of the river, through very shallow and fordable but totally devoid of cover. The fire fight continued until about 9 AM (26 April 1945), when the firing from the Japanese side gradually subsided and finally stopped, this happening puzzled us.”
From Sibala’s account, it can be surmised that the local guerrillas had been fighting against the remaining units of the Japanese forces in the morning of 26 April 1945. The fighting stopped, however, when a messenger arrived, and spoke to Sibala.
The messenger brought with him a radio message from Colonel Mahoney of the 164th Infantry Regiment, who had just landed at Lo-oc Beach, Sibulan. For some unexplained reason, Mahoney ordered the guerrillas under the command of Sibala to retreat one mile from the Banica River.
Sibala and the officers with him – Captain Ridad and Lt. Orlando Consing – were flabbergasted to hear such orders. They were so close to liberating Dumaguete, and yet, they were told to retreat. Captain Ridad complained to Sibala, and said “Sir, we waited for four years to enter Dumaguete, and now that we are only a few yards away, we are ordered to move back one mile!”
One can only feel the sentiment felt by these officers who were almost there, almost achieving glory in liberating their fellow Dumagueteños from Japanese rule; but, for reasons still unknown, they were told by the Americans not to continue with their push and retreat a mile away from the Banica River.
Consequently, Sibala, the good soldier that he was, followed the orders of Colonel Mahoney and retreated. He then ordered his men to cease fire, and stand by for further orders.
Along with Ridad and Consing, Sibala tried to observe and check on the Japanese positions only to see that that the remaining Japanese units had retreated – they were gone and presumably fled to Luzuriaga.
Knowing that the Japanese had escaped, Major Sibala, together with his other officers, walked to downtown Dumaguete, and passed by the main road (now known as Perdices Street). They walked along Dumaguete Cathedral, then reached Park Theater wherein they saw Mayor Mariano Perdices, Rep, Jose Romero, and Serafin Teves looking at them from the balcony.
The three prominent men of Dumaguete waved at the officers, and greeted them. Sibala and his officers returned the greetings and asked them where the Japanese were. They said that the last Japanese units had left Dumaguete together with Gov. Guillermo Villanueva and his family to the hinterlands of Luzuriaga, where Colonel Oie was to hold his last stand.
Sibala wrote in his memoirs that afterwards, they “proceeded along the street towards Silliman campus on reconnaissance. The area was deserted. Upon nearing Silliman gate, an American tank appeared. It stopped and its turret cannon swung into our direction, so we raised our hands. The helmet wearing American tank commander appeared on top of the turret and shouted who we were. I answered that I was the guerrilla commander of the guerrilla unit attacking from the south and we were scouting the area for Japanese soldiers. He said, ‘Jesus Christ, I thought you were to be one mile from here.’ I asked him to radio his headquarters that the city was already clear of Japanese troops and our guerrilla units were along the Banica River. With that, the tank turned back.”
Thus, when the Americans arrived, downtown Dumaguete was clear of any Japanese military units. After the encounter with the tank commander, Sibala and his two officers – Ridad and Consing – then returned to their men along the Banica, and were ready for the next mission – to pursue and subjugate the Japanese forces (under Colonel Oie) who were heavily entrenched and fortified in the rugged, mountainous terrain of Luzuriaga, around the area of the Mt. Talinis.
As of writing, there is still no clear reason why the Americans ordered the local guerrillas to retreat a mile away from Banica River. One can only infer that the incident seemed like a case of a “race” on who should liberate the town first – similar to the race to Berlin between the Americans under General Patton (on the one hand) and the Soviets under Marshals Zhukov and Konev (on the other hand). In the end, it was the Soviet Red Army who arrived first in Berlin, much to the dismay of Patton and the American forces.
Suffice to say, the liberation of Dumaguete did not really mean the end of the war in the province of Negros Oriental, as skirmishes and organized attacks of the 164th Infantry Regiment and the local guerrilla forces continued on the Japanese position in Luzuriaga from May-June 1945.
There was also the problem of food supply for the local populace right after the liberation; this was later on remedied by the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit that provided the necessary food and other supplies for the people of Dumaguete and other towns in Negros Oriental.
In spite of these hardships, the liberation of Dumaguete undoubtedly signified freedom from Japanese rule and the return to normalcy. It took a while for the local populace of Dumaguete and other towns of the Province to recover from the war, but resilient as Oriental Negrenses were, they went on with their respective lives; but they have never forgotten the efforts of the local guerrillas and the American forces who liberated them from Japanese rule.
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Author’s email: JJAbulado@norsu.edu.ph
