I decided to write about Governor Guillermo Z. Villanueva, or “Memong” as he was known to his friends and family, because of my interest on his collaboration case with the Japanese occupying forces of Negros Oriental.
He, along with other local politicians, opted to collaborate with the Japanese in order to continue any semblance of government; this was meant, as envisaged by the Japanese war strategists, to encourage the Filipinos to support Japanese rule and see them as emancipators of Western colonizers, in our case the Americans.
Governor Villanueva was a native Baisanon. From his surname, Villanueva, one can infer that he belonged to wealthy political clan or family. This statement would hold true as his father was Hermenegildo Villanueva, and his mother was Josefina Rubio – both of whom were landed elites in Bais.
Villanueva was a well-educated individual – receiving his Bachelor of Arts degree from Silliman Institute in 1913 and Bachelor of Laws from Michigan University in 1918. After finishing his education in the US, Villanueva returned to the Philippines in 1919; his political career started when he was appointed as councilor of Bais in 1920 and eventually a member of Congress in 1922.
He served four consecutive terms as congressman, re-elected in 1925, 1928, and 1931. During his third term, he was elected as Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture; he also took particular interest in the field of education by serving as a member of the Joint Committee of the Legislature, which reviewed the school system of the Philippine Islands.
Suffice it to say, he was part of the Villanueva dynasty which dominated Negros Oriental politics during the American period. After his stint as congressman, he was elected Governor of Negros Oriental just before World War II. Thus, he eventually became the wartime governor during the Japanese occupation of Negros Oriental.
Out of the many collaborators in Negros Oriental it was Villanueva who was often antagonized by the guerrillas given how he actively cooperated with the Japanese forces. Unlike Mayor Mariano Perdices who worked surreptitiously with the guerrillas, Governor Villanueva opted to play it safe and worked solely for the Japanese forces.
The task of Memong as wartime governor was difficult.
Firstly, it must be emphasized, that he did not exercise any form of power as governor as the final say often lay with the Japanese army commander in the province. His role was merely to help in the pacification campaign wherein he and other provincial and municipal officials would go to different towns in Negros Oriental to convince other officials and civilians to return to the occupied areas. This role was not easy as it made others think – especially the guerrillas – that they had become puppets of the Japanese forces.
Secondly, he had to face opposition mainly from the guerrillas as the latter would invariably – in most cases – think that the governor was an active collaborator of the Japanese. An active collaborator meant that he actively cooperated “in favor of the enemy’s principle and policies.”
Lastly, unlike Mayor Perdices, VIllanueva did not blatantly play the double game; he was conservative in his decisions, and he had to play it safe – at times too safe as he did not want the Japanese forces to harm him and his family (he had ten children).
As Governor, his first directive stated that: “All officials and employees and prominent persons must come down from the hills to resume their normal business and occupation and offices on or before June 30, 1942. Failure to do so will subject such officials and employees, and prominent persons to prosecution in accordance with the military laws of the Imperial Forces of the Japanese.”
This directive caused many Oriental Negrenses – especially those loyal to the Americans, like the guerrillas – to question his allegiance. But in hindsight, one has to consider that the governor’s role in the occupied are was verily limited. He did not have the power and influence he had before the war. Some accounts would state that he merely accompanied the Japanese in different towns of the province to help convince hitherto elected municipal officials to return to town.
The first areas that Villanueva and the Japanese visited were the southern areas of Negros Oriental. Their pacification – through the policy of attraction – campaign in the south was reasonably successful, and they were able to convince the mayors of Bacong, Dauin, Zamboanguita, Siaton, and Tolong to return to town.
It must be noted, however, that Villanueva played a vital role in convincing these municipal officials; it was not necessarily done out of coercion, but Villanueva would invariably warn those municipal officials who had not returned to their post that if they did not follow the order of the Japanese, “…he, the governor, would not be able to protect the mayor and his family from the wrath of the Japanese.”
This was not a threat but a warning which showed how the Governor lacked the authority, power, and influence to protect his fellow government officials. He had to do this, if under duress, to gain the trust and confidence of the Japanese forces. Concomitantly, after he was able to convince the previous officials to return to their post, the Japanese came in and ordered “the local mayors and chiefs of police to collect and surrender all private arms and the weapons of all ex-USAFFE soldiers who might have returned to their homes.”
This, then, became the primary role of the municipal mayor and other officials – it was a relatively dangerous task as they would oftentimes be antagonized by the guerrillas, but they had to do it to survive.
Villanueva continued with his pacification campaign to the north of Dumaguete, but he was not as successful in these areas compared to the south. More specifically, in Old Ayuquitan (now San Jose), Mayor Norberto Pareja defied his orders to return to post and opted to escape to the hinterlands – then eventually cross Tañon Strait heading to Cebu – to prevent from collaborating with the Japanese.
Moreover, Old Ayuquitan was also a hotbed for the guerrillas since this was the hometown of Federico Ridad, an officer in the guerrilla movement. With the continuous raids done by the guerrillas in the Ayuquitan area and the bellicosity of Mayor Pareja, Villanueva and the Japanese troops then had no choice but to constantly revisit the area and inveterately try to ameliorate the situation – continuing with their mission of attracting the locals and guerrillas to return to town.
Governor Villanueva, therefore, mainly served as a buffer between the Japanese and the local populace of Negros Oriental. While it is true that he was always with the Japanese in their pacification campaign, it must also be emphasized that he did not have any form of power to order the arrest of his fellow Oriental Negrenses, nor were there accounts which would show that Villanueva was an informer or a spy of the Japanese occupying forces.
His role, again, was that of a messenger trying to convince the people to return to the occupied areas. The only problem was the he was always seen with the Japanese, which could have caused the guerrillas to suppose he was an active collaborator. Nevertheless, as Donn V. Hart pointed out: “no Filipino official, however, could make a major decision without the approval of the Japanese.”
Given that Villanueva – and perhaps most of the other puppet officials – did not exercise power under the Japanese occupation, why then did the local guerrillas consider him an enemy? In fact, as a result, the guerrillas even attempted to assassinate him and others during the Japanese occupation.
Villanueva was undoubtedly seen in a negative light, as shown in the guerrilla reports and local historical works on Negros Oriental. What then could be the reason for this negative portrayal? More on this in my next column.
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Author’s email: [email protected]
